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ABSTRACT:  
The Spanish Civil War marks an important chapter 
in the development of  non-governmental refugee 
aid as we know it. But studying the case of  U.S. aid 
for Spanish Republican refugees also brings into 
focus some of  the tensions and contradictions 
associated with the concept of  humanitarianism, 
including the role played by documentary images. 
What were the ideals that moved those who fought 
against fascism or aided antifascist refugees in the 
1930s and ‘40s? Were they properly political, or did 
they transcend politics, becoming humanitarian? 
The distinction is crucial to understanding the 
efforts undertaken to aid Spanish Civil War 
refugees and the obstacles that these efforts faced. 
 
1. A Doctor Jailed 
 
In June 1950, the Federal Reformatory in 
Petersburg, Virginia opened its doors to doctor 
Edward Barsky, the man who had saved 
thousands of  lives during the Spanish Civil 
War, working as a surgeon and director of  
medical services, and who in the years after had 
provided support to thousands of  Republican 
refugees in France and Mexico (Deery 2009).1 
Joining Barsky’s fate, albeit in different prisons, 
were an additional ten members of  the Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (JAFRC). 
They were accused of  anti-American activities, 
having refused to hand over their 
organization’s archive—which included long 
                                                 
1 This article takes up some of  the arguments outlined in Faber (2010, 2011, 2012). 
lists of  Spanish refugees in France—to the U.S. 
Congress. Soon after, Barsky even lost his 
medical license (Carroll, 1994: 286; Deery, 
2009; Deery, 2014).  
The JAFRC had worked closely with the 
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
(UUSC), then still named Unitarian Service 
Committee (USC), which itself  became a 
target of  a congressional investigation. In a 
letter from 2009, Charles Clements, the then 
director of  the UUSC, criticized the way the 
United States had treated its own pioneers of  
humanitarian aid. “Though UUSC was never 
prosecuted,” he wrote, “many individuals and 
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the organization suffered the consequences of  
our involvement in Spain and with Spanish 
Civil War refugees …” But, he added, “there 
are no regrets. It was the right thing to do.”2  
In the editorial that opened the first issue of  
the Anales del Hospital Varsovia, a hospital 
journal published in the summer of  1948, very 
similar sentiments were voiced. The Varsovia 
Hospital had been founded in Toulouse, in 
Southern France, by Spanish refugee doctors 
after the Republic’s defeat in the Spanish Civil 
War, in order to meet their fellow refugees’ 
medical needs. It functioned, and survived 
World War II, in large part thanks to strong 
support from abroad, including the JAFRC 
and the Unitarians. Why, the editorial 
wondered, were the very people who had been 
allies and benefactors through these difficult 
years now targeted for persecution in their own 
country?3 “It is with deep emotion that we 
receive the news that the board of  the Joint 
Antifascist Refugee Committee in New York 
has been imprisoned for the ‘horrendous 
crime’ of  being antifascist …” Barsky and his 
partners, the editors stated, did not commit any 
other crime than “staying true to the ideals for 
which thousands of  people fought and died in 
the past war, and coming to the aid of  those 
who were hurt in that fight” (Anales, 1948: 1). 
But what precisely were the ideals that the 
authors of  the editorial were referring to? In 
our pragmatic, post-ideological times, idealism 
perhaps no longer has the positive connotation 
it had then. After all, how does one distinguish 
between an idealist, an extremist, and a 
fundamentalist? But the question is relevant 
nonetheless. What were the ideals that moved 
those who fought against fascism or aided 
antifascist refugees in the 1930s and ‘40s? Were 
they properly political, or did they transcend 
                                                 
2 Charles Clements, Letter to Àlvar Martínez Vidal, 15 September 2009.  
3 According to Pike, the Joint Anti-Fascist RefugeeCommittee sent some 370,000 Francs per month to 
the hospital through the Unitarian Service Comittee (Pike, 1984 : 175). 
politics, becoming humanitarian? The 
distinction is not merely academic. It is crucial 
to understand the efforts undertaken to aid 
Spanish Civil War refugees and the obstacles 
that these efforts faced. 
For legal and fiscal purposes, refugee aid is 
generally considered a humanitarian activity as 
opposed to direct political intervention. But 
there is something strange about that 
distinction. Most of  the massive displacements 
that we have seen in the 20th and 21st 
centuries have responded to profoundly 
political causes. Displacement, after all, is often 
the result of  some form of  expulsion that 
occurs when a national community refuses to 
tolerate particular groups in its midst. But this 
also means that expressions of  solidarity with 
the displaced, and any attempt to aid them, are 
at bottom political. This has indeed been the 
view of  many involved in refugee aid over the 
past eighty years—and it was shared by the 
likes of  U.S. Senator McCarthy or the members 
of  the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities (HUAC). McCarthy, HUAC and 
others devoted themselves for decades to 
persecuting U.S. citizens who tried to alleviate 
the suffering of  the Spanish Republicans for 
whom returning to Franco’s Spain would have 
been tantamount to suicide.  
 
2. The Republic’s Visual Propaganda 
 
From the moment the Spanish Civil War broke 
out in July 1936, both Republicans and 
Nationalists invested a great amount of  effort 
in campaigns meant to rally international 
public opinion to their side. Visual 
communication was central to this effort 
(García 2010). Among the Republic’s strengths 
in the struggle for international support was 
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not only the fact that it could count on the help 
of  large groups of  talented visual artists and 
designers. Key, too, was the Republic’s ability 
to frame the Spanish Civil War as much more 
than a political cause. From very early on, the 
Republican authorities managed to solidify a 
simple but powerful message: supporting the 
Republic was a humanitarian imperative. The 
fact that the rebels were massively targeting 
regular citizens made this argument both 
realistic and convincing. As a result, the most 
iconic images of  the Spanish Civil War involve 
not soldiers but civilians. 
As it happened, leading the Republic’s 
international propaganda effort was the very 
man who fifteen years earlier had discovered 
the mobilizing potential of  humanitarian 
causes: Willi Münzenberg. Münzenberg had 
started working with the Communist 
International in the late 1910s. In 1921, at 
Lenin’s suggestion, he had founded his first 
large public-relations enterprise, the 
Internationale Arbeiter-Hilfe (Workers’ 
International Relief; IAH or WIR). Set up to 
bring relief  to the famine-stricken Volga 
region, the IAH was a tremendous success. It 
contained the seed of  much of  what would 
later follow (Cuevas-Wolf, 2009: 187). 
“Münzenberg had hit on a new technique in 
mass propaganda, based on a simple 
observation,” wrote the Hungarian writer 
Arthur Koestler, who worked closely with 
Münzenberg in Paris during the years of  the 
Spanish Civil War:  
 
if  a person gives money to a cause, he 
becomes emotionally involved in that cause. 
The greater the sacrifice, the stronger the 
bond; provided, of  course, that the cause for 
which you are asked to make the sacrifice is 
brought to life in a vivid and imaginative 
manner—and that was Willy’s specialty. He 
did not, for instance, ask the workers for 
charitable alms; he asked them to donate one 
day’s wages “as an act of  solidarity with the 
Russian people.” “Solidarity” instead of  
“charity” became the keyword of  his 
campaign, and the key-slogan of  the IWA. 
Contributors were given IWA stamps, badges, 
medals, pictures of  life in the U.S.S.R., busts 
of  Marx and Lenin—each donation was 
forged into a link. Willy had found the pattern 
which he was to repeat in founding the 
“World Committee for the Relief  of  the 
Victims of  German Fascism” and in his 
various Chinese, Spanish and other relief  
campaigns: charity as a vehicle for political 
action. (Koestler, 1969: 252) 
 
Through the IAH, which quickly turned into 
an all-purpose relief  organization, 
Münzenberg came to understand the 
mobilizing power of  the written and visual 
media. In the years following he assumed an 
increasingly central role as the founder and 
director of  newspapers and journals, film 
production and distribution companies, as well 
as illustrated magazines (Cuevas-Wolf, 2009: 
190). Thanks to Münzenberg and his 
assistants, the public discourse of  the left 
throughout the 1930s—as materialized in 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, 
demonstrations, associations and campaigns—
achieved an unprecedented level of  
sophistication, exposure and message control, 
helping the causes he championed attain high 
levels of  support among the general public. 
Münzenberg was “ahead of  both the American 
and Soviet governments when it came to 
influencing public opinion, especially in 
Western Europe,” Koestler’s biographer 
Michael Scammell writes. “He, more than any 
other single person, might be said to be the 
original father of  the cultural cold war, 
pioneering, with his committees, his 
congresses, his front magazines, and his 
international petitions, methods that were to 
become commonplace during the post–World 
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War II conflict between the CIA and the 
KGB” (Scammell 2005).  
Yet even Münzenberg’s genius could not quell 
the tensions undermining the broad anti-
fascist alliance that the Popular Front was 
meant to foster—tensions that the Spanish 
Civil War brought sharply to the fore. They 
were philosophical and political, and 
concerned both strategy and tactics. Was the 
left to primarily advocate pacifism, or armed 
resistance and struggle? Was it to glorify some 
forms of  violence, accept them as unfortunate 
but necessary, or condemn them outright? Was 
it to limit its internationalist commitment to 
social and humanitarian aid, or include political 
and military intervention? In what follows I 
will formulate two main arguments. First, the 
Spanish Civil War marks an important chapter 
in the development of  non-governmental 
refugee aid as we know it. Second, studying the 
case of  U.S. aid for Spanish Republican 
refugees brings into focus some of  the 
tensions and contradictions associated with the 
concept of  humanitarianism, including the 
role played by documentary images, particularly 
photographs of  victims. 
Given the nature of  the war in Spain and 
Münzenberg’s central role in shaping its 
narrative, the documentary legacy of  the 
Spanish Civil War is, among other things, a 
visual archive of  civilian hardship. It 
documents the lives of  the thousands of  
women, children and elderly who died in the 
urban bombing campaigns (Guernica, 
Barcelona, Valencia, Madrid), and the 
hundreds of  thousands of  Spaniards who were 
driven from their homes—and eventually their 
country—by the advance of  Franco’s forces. 
And if  this was the first time that magazine and 
newspaper readers got to see a major armed 
conflict up close, it was also the first time the 
modern visual media documented the tragic 
fate of  the displaced (Sontag, 2003: 21). 
Images we are now used and perhaps numb 
to—long columns of  civilians on foot carrying 
as much as they humanly can; throngs of  
people bottlenecked at a border post; 
emaciated but combative men herded into 
makeshift camps; anonymous victims looking 
into the camera from behind a barbed-wire 
fence—first reached the global public’s eyes in 
1936-1939.  
As I’ve argued elsewhere, the Spanish Civil 
War saw the visual birth of  the modern refugee 
(Faber 2011). But the humanitarian legacy of  
the Spanish Civil War goes beyond images. The 
visual media coverage of  the Spanish 
displacement crisis helped spark a 
humanitarian impulse that gave rise to 
governmental and non-governmental agencies 
focused primarily on refugee aid—and which, 
in turn, were quick to realize the power of  
visual media to move the public to action. 
Using this public support, in the years 
following the Spanish Civil War these agencies 
saved thousands of  lives and helped establish 
the organizational infrastructure and legal 
framework that still exist today. But the 
difficulties and contradictions that some of  
these pioneering initiatives ran into, both 
during and after the war in Spain, are also a 
necessary part of  this story.  
The photographers covering the Spanish Civil 
War shot many images of  displaced civilians 
that caused great distress among readers and 
viewers elsewhere in the world. Scenes that by 
now have become familiar were anything but 
in the 1930s. As I wrote in the catalog of  the 
exhibit The Mexican Suitcase, which gathers 
more than 4,000 photographic images of  the 
Spanish Civil War shot by Robert Capa, Gerda 
Taro, and David Seymour: 
 
The first analogies that came to mind were 
biblical. In February 1939, the editors of  the 
Picture Post, at a loss for words, compare the 
images of  this “greatest mass flight in modern 
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history” to the Old Testament or a “painting 
by one of  the old masters.” Life magazine’s 
headlines talk about “the greatest mass 
exodus of  modern times,” a “heroically tragic 
epic”: “Rarely have so much despair and 
physical misery been seen in one place in the 
history of  the world” (Life, 1939: 28). To be 
sure, this was not the first large-scale refugee 
crisis of  the twentieth century—the 
aftermath of  World War I had seen mass 
displacements, too. But, as said, it was the first 
to be widely covered by the visual media. We 
might say that Capa, Taro and Chim played a 
key role in establishing the iconography of  
twentieth-century displacement. (Faber 2011) 
 
From the beginning, this iconography 
manifested an unresolved tension. On the one 
hand, the Spanish people—men, women, and 
children—were depicted in posters, newsreel 
footage, documentaries, and photographs as 
deeply politicized heroes bravely fighting on 
the frontline of  the struggle against world 
fascism. On the other hand, they were 
portrayed as defenseless victims in need of  
protection and aid.  
 
3. The Politics of  Humanitarianism  
 
A very similar tension was built in the refugee 
laws and policies, as well as the organizational 
infrastructures for refugee aid which began to 
emerge on a broad, international scale around 
this very same time. At the heart of  this 
tension between the refugee as agent and as 
victim is the distinction between the 
humanitarian and the political. Should mass 
displacements due to causes other than natural 
disasters be classified as a humanitarian or a 
political phenomenon—and do they call for 
humanitarian or political solutions? Hannah 
Arendt famously pushed for the latter. The 
statelessness of  refugees, she argued in The 
Origins of  Totalitarianism, in effect leaves them 
without rights; and the ability of  states to 
simply expel whole communities of  unwanted 
is a perverse byproduct of  the doctrine of  state 
sovereignty (Arendt, 1973: 271-90). “The 
popular idea that the world refugee problem is 
somehow independent of  politics is certainly 
touching,” Roger Rosenblatt wrote more 
recently a propos of  the war in Kosovo; “But 
it is also stupid and dangerous. The confusion 
works to the great advantage of  the world’s 
more malevolent leaders […] because the 
preoccupation with suffering, any suffering, 
diverts attention from what produced that 
suffering in the first place” (Rosenblatt, 1999: 
18-19).  
But if  the distinction between politics and 
humanitarianism in matters of  refugee aid is 
arguable, it was nevertheless crucial to the 
thousands of  U.S. citizens who felt deeply 
affected by the events in Spain and compelled 
to do something to help. The distinction was 
especially important to the fundraising efforts 
on behalf  of  Republican Spain during and 
after the conflict. The neutrality laws that the 
U.S. Congress had adopted in 1935, 1936 and 
1937 expressly prohibited any contribution to 
the military effort, and barely left a legal 
loophole for collections aimed at “purely” 
humanitarian objectives. Once the Republic 
had been defeated, the same legal and fiscal 
limitation applied to the many organizations 
dedicated to refugee aid. Ironically, however, 
the legal framework that made the aid possible 
in the first place ended up being the source of  
its demise. The mere suspicion that entities like 
that headed up by Barsky had political motives 
was enough to paralyze them almost 
completely. In fact, the House Un-American 
Activities Committee justified its investigation 
of  Barsky c.s. by alleging that they were 
involved in subversive political propaganda 
instead of  humanitarian work. J. Edgar 
Hoover, the director of  the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation, for his part, believed that the 
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veterans of  the Abraham Lincoln Brigade—
the U.S. volunteers who had fought in the 
Spanish Civil War—had been trained as the 
military vanguard to be deployed for a 
Communist revolution in the United States, 
and that this enterprise was being financed in 
part with the funds that the JAFRC was raising 
(Deery, 2009: 174-176).  
Sadly, the fate of  Barsky and his partners was 
representative of  the work done in the United 
States on behalf  of  the Spanish Republican 
refugees. Their effort was important and 
valiant, but it ran into two important obstacles: 
attempts at sabotage from reactionary corners 
and, as we will see in a moment, increasing 
internal divisions that were also political in 
nature. Perhaps not surprisingly, these 
divisions tended to center on the 
organizational role and aspirations (public or 
secret, real or suspected) of  the Communists. 
The truth is that, in the United States, the Cold 
War began in the 1920s, with a slight respite 
between 1935 and 1945, although it never 
retreated completely. Even at the height of  
Popular-Front collaboration in support of  the 
Spanish Republic, there were mutual 
suspicions, especially between Socialists and 
Communists, and between Stalinists and anti-
Stalinists (Smith, 2009: 145). 
 
4. U.S. Support of  the Spanish Republic 
 
If  the 1930s in the United States were years of  
misery, social tension and economic crisis, they 
also saw an unprecedented level of  civic 
mobilization and solidarity, sparking the 
constant, feverish creation of  associations, 
leagues, alliances, clubs, groups and unions, all 
with their own abbreviations, meetings, 
national and local committees, and newsletters 
and magazines. All this organizational energy 
responded to fear, and a need for mutual 
protection, but also to a utopian drive. The 
outbreak of  the war in Spain served, among 
other things, to intensify and justify those fears 
while at the same time fueling the political 
hopes and aspirations of  the U.S. population 
and its leaders. This explains why, almost 
immediately after the beginning of  the Spanish 
Civil War, the country saw the emergence of  
hundreds of  organizations identified with the 
Republican side (Rey García, 1997; Smith, 
2013). The story of  the almost 3,000 U.S. 
volunteers who participated in the Spanish 
Civil War is well known. But in reality tens of  
thousands of  U.S. citizens saw their lives 
marked, for at least three years, by a deep and 
genuine concern over Spain.  
The most important of  the pro-Republican 
organizations in the United States was the 
North American Committee to Aid Spanish 
Democracy (NACASD o NAC). Founded in 
October 1936 at the initiative of  the American 
Friends of  Spanish Democracy and other 
allied groups, it was directed by the Methodist 
bishop Francis McConnell and the reverend 
Herman Reissig. The American Friends also 
created the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish 
Democracy (MBASD), headed by Dr. Barsky 
(Rey García, 1997: 89,100), which merged with 
the North American Committee in January 
1938 (Smith 2009). Both organizations were 
“Popular-Frontist” in nature, in the sense that 
they served to bring together around the cause 
of  antifascism people from a broad range of  
political backgrounds, from pacifists and 
liberal progressives to Communists and 
Socialists—the kind of  broad unity in the face 
of  fascism that Georgi Dimitrov, head of  the 
Communist International, had called for in the 
summer of  1935. Like many of  the 
organizations inspired by Dimitrov’s appeal, 
the NAC and MBASD benefited by the 
presence, expertise and organizational capacity 
of  the Communists, without necessarily ceding 
all institutional control to them. (Eric Smith, 
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who has investigated the organizational 
dynamic of  refugee aid groups, concludes that 
the Communist Party made important 
contributions to the refugee organizations but 
was never able to take full control of  their 
leadership [2009, 138, 145, 164-65]; see also 
Rey García, 1997: 87-112.) 
Between 1936 and 1939, the NAC and 
MBASD undertook a series of  successful 
publicity campaigns that attracted broad media 
attention and allowed them to raise an 
important amount of  funds. By January 1938, 
for instance, the Medical Bureau declared it 
had raised more than 150,000 dollars (Rey 
García, 1997: 92).4 These funds allowed the 
Bureau to send medical personnel, drugs, 
ambulances and other goods to Republican 
Spain, where Barsky was doing an 
extraordinary job organizing the Republican 
army’s medical services and hospital 
installations (Deery, 2009: 171). But pro-
Republican organizations in the United States 
did not limit themselves to medical and 
humanitarian aid. They also applied pressure to 
the Roosevelt administration to abandon 
neutrality, lift the arms embargo on Spain, and 
intercede on behalf  of  Spain’s democratically 
elected government. The three years of  intense 
concern and dedication are an important 
chapter in the collective memory of  the 
American Left (Carroll & Fernández 2007). 
 
6. Refugee Aid and Visual Media 
 
It is not hard to imagine the psychological and 
political impact on this community of  the 
news that Franco had finally won the war. Still, 
                                                 
4 Smith cites the official numbers from the U.S. government, which state that the NAC and MBASD 
together raised $805,799.78 (Smith, 2009: 153).  
5 “Questions and answers on the Spanish refugees. A supplement to the Pilot manual”; “Resolution No. 
1. Adopted at the Executive Board Meeting of  the Medical Bureau and North American Committee to 
Aid Spanish Democracy. April 18, 1939”, Spanish Refugee Relief  archives, Columbia University, Part L, 
Box 2.  
the Republican cause did not die. More 
Spaniards than ever were in need of  aid, 
although the nature of  the aid they needed had 
changed. In the face of  these developments, 
several pro-Republican organizations decided 
to dissolve or turned themselves into 
nonprofits exclusively devoted to aid to 
prisoners and refugees. In the three or four 
years following, a large number of  
organizations of  this type emerged—dozens 
in the United States alone, where the most 
important at the national level were the Joint 
Antifascist Refugee Committee, already 
mentioned, along with the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), the Unitarian 
Service Committee (USC), the Spanish 
Refugee Relief  Campaign (SRRC), the 
International Relief  Association, and the 
Emergency Rescue Committee (ERC), which 
would later merge with the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC). Although all these 
organizations defined their mission as 
exclusively humanitarian, and although several 
worked together, their job was soon hampered 
by tensions and conflicts of  a political nature.  
In April 1939, the NAC/MBASD transformed 
itself  into the Spanish Refugee Relief  
Campaign (SRRC), with a purely humanitarian 
profile and with “no connection with any 
political group.”5 The decision to minimize the 
political profile of  the old NAC was both 
tactical and pragmatic. The half  million 
Spanish refugees in southern France posed a 
tremendous humanitarian challenge, whose 
solution demanded an unprecedented 
fundraising effort. More than ever it was 
necessary to appeal to the broadest possible 
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segment of  the U.S. population. No one 
doubted that clear political affiliations would 
prove counterproductive for this effort, 
especially among the various religious 
communities. Similarly, it was necessary to 
depoliticize the organization in order to make 
it eligible for the increasingly generous funds 
that the U.S. administration and other 
governments were setting aside for refugee aid 
in Europe through the National War Fund 
(1943-47) and the War Refugee Board (1944-
45).  
The SRRC’s main task was to maintain the 
American public interest for the Spanish 
problem, to convince it that the suffering of  
hundreds of  thousands of  Spanish refugees in 
the south of  France was unjust and 
unacceptable, and persuade it of  the fact that 
the urgency of  the situation transcended any 
kind of  particular political interest. With those 
goals in mind, the SRRC developed several 
visual media campaigns. This made sense; after 
all, as we have seen, photography and film had 
already been central to media coverage of  the 
war, as well as in both camps’ efforts to secure 
international support.  
In fact, the refugee crisis only intensified the 
role of  photojournalism. The images of  the 
thousands of  desperate refugees who starting 
in January tried to cross the Spanish-French 
border were more dramatic than ever. But 
these pictures did not only appear in magazines 
and newspapers. Capa and other 
photographers allowed the SRRC and other 
refugee organizations to use them for their 
awareness and fundraising campaigns, trying to 
turn the public’s indignation into a 
philanthropic impulse (Faber 2009). In the 
course of  1939, the New York office of  the 
SRRC and its more than 100 delegations across 
the United States undertook a large number of  
projects. The most ambitious among these was 
a fundraising campaign around a 30-minute 
documentary film on the French concentration 
camps in which the hundreds of  thousands of  
Republican refugees languished. Entitled 
Refuge, it was a dubbed and shortened version 
of  the French film Un peuple attend (A People in 
Waiting), directed that same year by Jean-Paul 
LeChanois (also known as Jean-Paul Dreyfus). 
It included newsreel footage but also original 
takes of  life in the camps, shot with a camera 
hidden in a grocery bag (Crusells 2006). 
 
7. Unitarians Under Fire 
 
The Refuge campaign was the SRRC’s last large 
project. As many other Popular-Front 
organizations, it did not survive the 
consequences of  the German-Soviet non-
aggression pact of  August 1939. In March of  
the following year, a conflict between 
Communists and non-Communists led to the 
departure of  Barsky and his allies. (Barsky had 
joined the CPUSA in 1935 [Deery, 2009: 170].) 
Those who left formed their own independent 
organization, devoted primarily to a “Rescue 
Ship Mission”—a boat that would transport 
Spanish refugees to Latin America—but that 
project, too, ran aground due to internal 
conflicts and barriers that the U.S. government 
put up. In March 1942, the United American 
Spanish Aid Committee, the Rescue Ship 
Mission and the American Committee to Save 
Refugees merged to form the Joint Antifascist 
Refugee Committee. Directed once more by 
Eddie Barsky, it poured all its energies in a new 
campaign: the “Spanish Refugee Appeal”. 
(The remaining members of  the SRRC, 
meanwhile, ended up joining the Emergency 
Rescue Committee (ERC), directed from 
France by Varian Fry, who famously helped 
save dozens of  artists and intellectuals, 
including Hannah Arendt, Marc Chagall, and 
Anna Seghers.) Because the JAFRC did not 
have a license to dispense humanitarian aid in 
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Europe, however, Barsky’s committee allied 
itself  from the start with the Unitarian Service 
Committee (USC). It was the USC which 
distributed the funds raised by the JAFRC, 
under specific conditions set by Barsky’s 
group. This is how we come back to the 
Varsovia Hospital, which was one of  the main 
collaborative projects between the Joint 
Antifascists and the Unitarians.  
The Unitarian Service Committee, established 
in 1940 by the American Unitarian Association 
(AUA), was one of  the largest and most 
important U.S. refugee organizations. It played 
a decisive role saving thousands of  displaced 
Europeans before, during, and after World War 
II. At the height of  its activity, the USC 
managed an annual budget of  over a million 
dollars. These funds came from different 
sources: not only the National War Fund, the 
War Refugee Board and the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees, but also from 
Barsky’s Spanish Refugee Appeal, which over 
its various years of  operation ended up 
contributing some 300,000 dollars (DiFiglia 
1990).  
To understand this alliance between the U.S. 
radical Left and a religious organization like the 
Unitarian Church, it’s worth recalling the 
prominent presence of  several Protestant 
congregations among the organizations that 
rallied behind the Spanish Republic from the 
beginning of  the Civil War. Although the 
American Unitarian Association itself  did not 
have a clearly defined political profile, the 
Service Committee—as well as the 
organization’s monthly magazine, The Christian 
Register—attracted intellectuals whose 
antifascist commitment had drawn them to the 
radical Left. Under the editorship of  Stephen 
                                                 
6 Testimony of  Howard Lee Brooks before the Committee on Un-American Activities. House, 21 
October 1946, p. 164, Lexis Nexis Congressional, Hearing ID HRG-1946-UAH-0012, CIS-NO: 79 HUna-
T.17, http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1946-uah-
0012?accountid=12933.  
Fritchman, for instance, the Register opened its 
pages to Communists and fellow travelers like 
Howard Fast, W.E.B. DuBois, Earl Browder, 
and Paul Robeson. Shortly after the end of  
World War II, the Unitarians’ refugee work 
suffered a major blow, thanks in large part to 
its collaboration with Barsky’s Joint Antifascist 
Refugee Committee. In late 1945, the House 
Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC)—created in 1938 and directed at that 
time by Representatives Wood and Rankin—
turned its eyes to the JAFRC. As mentioned 
above, HUAC suspected that the Committee 
was a Communist front organization, which 
would disqualify it for its federal license as a 
charitable, tax-exempt organization. (From its 
very founding, HUAC had been keenly 
interested in groups and individuals in 
solidarity with the Spanish Republic, including 
the veterans and friends of  the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade, as the group of  U.S. 
volunteers in Spain became known.) HUAC’s 
investigations of  the Joint Antifascist led it to 
the offices of  the Unitarian Service 
Committee, which after all was the recipient of  
the funds Barsky and his people raised.  
In October 1946, a seven-member Unitarian 
delegation appeared before Wood and Rankin 
to prove that the USC was a purely American 
and humanitarian organization—that is, 
apolitical and not subservient to foreign 
interests (Faber, 2012:50-52). In a closed 
session, the Unitarians declared that their 
Service Committee dispensed aid to all 
refugees in need of  it, independent of  their 
political affiliation, and “as long as there was 
no attempt to make use of  the relief  for 
political purposes”.6 At the same time, 
however, they had to admit that the USC had 
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no specific mechanisms in place to prevent the 
presence of  Communists in its ranks. The case 
attracted a fair amount of  media attention. It 
stained the Unitarians’ reputation and sparked 
political conflicts within the Association, while 
tensing the relations with other refugee aid 
organizations. Throwing more fuel on the fire, 
that same year a representative of  the rival 
International Rescue Committee wrote a letter 
to the Unitarian leadership to complain that 
two of  the USC’s central operatives in Europe, 
Herta (Jo) Tempi and Noel Field, were giving 
preferential treatment to Communist refugees, 
were themselves Communist Party members, 
and even worked for the Soviet secret police. 
Around the same time, similar charges 
surfaced in Toulouse, where several non-
Communist organizations alleged that the 
recipients of  USC funds were discriminating 
against non-Communists. This included the 
Varsovia Hospital, which in the U.S. was 
known as the Walter B. Cannon Memorial, 
named for a well-known surgeon from Boston 
who had died in 1945. In light of  these 
accusations, Cannon’s widow asked the Joint 
Antifascist Refugee Committee in 1948 to stop 
using her late husband’s name. The JAFCR 
ignored the request (Schlesinger, 2000: 403). 
By then, however, the Unitarians had already 
withdrawn from the hospital project.  
Although the charges of  discrimination were 
exaggerated, they held a kernel of  truth. The 
two main USC operatives in Europe, Jo Tempi 
and Noel Field, were Communists, as were 
many of  the refugees who received the 
Unitarians’ aid (Barth, Schweizer & Grimm 
2005; Pike, 1984: 174). This should not come 
as a surprise, given the high percentage of  
Communists among the refugee population as 
a whole. Still, the American Unitarian 
Association was alarmed by the accusations 
and sent an investigative committee to Europe. 
                                                 
7 Born in Germany in 1903, Falkenberg had emigrated to the United States in 1938. 
Its report concluded that there was no 
evidence to support the charges (Christian 
Register, 1946: 501-523). Nevertheless, the 
episode prompted a purge among the 
Unitarian ranks that lead to the departure of  
Fritchman (editor of  the Register), of  both 
Tempi and Field, and of  Charles Joy, who had 
directed the USC’s European operations (Pike, 
1984: 175). 
 
8. Images to the Rescue 
 
It was in the context of  growing doubt and 
suspicion that the USC and the JAFRC decided 
to undertake another publicity campaign that, 
once again, put visuals front and center. In 
1946, the USC and JAFRC commissioned the 
filmmaker Paul Falkenberg to produce the 
documentary Spain in Exile,7 and in the spring 
of  that same year, the USC hired Walter 
Rosenblum, a young Jewish photographer 
from New York, to spend several months in 
Europe to document the Committee’s 
extensive work with refugees. 
“It is certain that you will dislike the shameful 
truth that this picture is about to reveal,” 
Quentin Reynolds, a well-known war 
correspondent, tells the viewers in his 
introduction to Spain in Exile. “The picture is 
the story of  a debt—a debt that we owe, a debt 
that is still on the books. It is an old debt. It 
was incurred eight years ago, long before Hitler 
marched into Poland.” The film, 20 minutes in 
length, combines newsreel footage of  the 
Spanish Republican exodus in early 1939 with 
newly shot scenes documenting the lives of  the 
thousands of  Spanish refugees remaining in 
France. The narration links the Spanish Civil 
War directly to World War II. “We didn’t know 
then what we know now,” Reynolds’ voice 
booms over the heart-wrenching newsreel 
images of  the Spaniards’ border crossing and 
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their lives in the French refugee camps. “This 
is what total war looks like. The first 
experiment in total war and already half  a 
million refugees …” The film goes on to 
highlight the Spaniards’ role in the fight against 
the Nazis, their use as forced labor, and their 
passage through camps like Mauthausen, 
Dachau, and Bergen-Belsen. The film also 
contrasts their heroism in the struggle against 
international fascism with their precarious 
existence in postwar France—“They are 
underfed, poorly clad,” Reynolds says; “they 
wear the same clothing winter and summer”—
which is scandalously similar to their life 
during the war. At the same time, Spain in Exile 
highlights the good work done by the Joint 
Antifascist Refugee Committee through the 
Unitarian Service Committee at the Varsovia 
Hospital and elsewhere. After the film’s closing 
scene, Reynolds reappears on the screen with a 
final appeal to the viewers: 
 
You have just seen the truth about the first 
victims of  total war. It is not enough just to 
stand appalled. Our job is to see that the 
heroic men and women who struck the first 
blows against Hitler and Franco do not 
remain the forgotten fighters of  World War 
II. The children you have seen in this picture 
are the hope of  Spanish democracy. Boys and 
girls who were baptized in the blood of  their 
fathers fighting in Spain are the chief  concern 
of  the Committee. I hope they are your 
concern, too. 
 
While Spain in Exile was likely circulated 
among the Unitarian community, Rosenblum’s 
touching refugee portraits taken alongside the 
film crew reached a much wider audience. 
Rosenblum was a young progressive: born in 
1919 into a poor Jewish immigrant family 
living on New York’s Lower East Side, he had 
                                                 
8 Only a few of  Rosenblum’s 1946 photos made it into the press at the time. A fuller collection is held by 
the Tamiment Library at New York University. 
begun to photograph his neighborhood as a 
teenager, using a borrowed camera. In 1937 he 
joined the Photo League, a vibrant community 
of  New York photographers, where he met 
Lewis Hine, Berenice Abbott and Elizabeth 
McCausland, and studied with Paul Strand. 
When the USC hired him, he had just been 
discharged from the U.S. armed forces, where 
he had photographed and filmed the invasion 
of  Normandy and the liberation of  the 
Dachau concentration camp (Faber 2008). In 
the fall of  1946, Rosenblum’s photographs of  
Spanish refugees began to appear in the U.S. 
media—not merely in the Unitarian’s magazine 
The Christian Register but also in high-circulation 
venues like the New York Times, the New York 
Herald Tribune, the paper PM, and the popular 
weekly Liberty. 
Unlike Capa’s, Rosenblum’s refugee images 
were almost all posed. Showing the refugees in 
a dignified manner, they had great dramatic 
power. In a March 1947 reportage in Liberty 
magazine, Rosenblum’s photographs 
transmitted a clear aesthetic and political 
purpose. But while the captions mentioned the 
Spaniards’ role in the anti-Nazi resistance, the 
images themselves avoided the association of  
the Republicans with political militancy or 
armed struggle. Instead, they emphasized the 
Spaniards’ material needs and social 
respectability.8 The reportage opened with a 
full-page print of  two refugee boys showering. 
The other photographs showed one-armed 
men stitching espadrilles (“Badly disabled 
exiles, like these who lost arms fighting the 
Nazis, will do any kind of  work to keep their 
self-respect”); happy children eating, playing, 
and receiving donated clothes; Spanish 
surgeons administering a spinal puncture; and 
a perfectly composed image of  a father-like 
doctor in a pinstripe suit (he “served with the 
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Maquis, then returned to help his fellow 
exiles”) giving friendly advice to a four-year-
old girl—an image more resonant of  an 
advertisement than of  news photography 
(Rosenblum, 19). 
Yet even this successful campaign involving 
film and photography did not serve to stem the 
negative effects of  the HUAC investigation. As 
fundraising dwindled—both among the 
Unitarian congregations and the general 
public—government funds dried up as well. 
By 1948, the USC had cut its number of  
programs in half. By early 1949, Noel Field, 
who had left the USC in December 1947, 
mysteriously disappeared. In the course of  the 
next three years, his name came up 
prominently in several spy trials in Hungary, 
East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. (It later 
transpired that he had been abducted by secret 
police.) In the early 1950s, two prominent 
American Trotskyites, Nancy and Dwight 
MacDonald founded the Spanish Refugee Aid 
(SRA), devoted exclusively to aiding non-
Communist refugees, whose fate, the 
MacDonalds felt, had been neglected for years.  
Dr. Barsky’s fate, meanwhile, had taken a turn 
for the worse. He had founded the American 
Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy. He 
had been one of  the first Americans to leave 
for Spain, where he founded and managed 
seven hospitals, and reached the rank of  major 
by October 1938. He had helped found the 
Joint Antifascist Refugee Committee in 1942, 
which among other things sponsored the 
transport of  Spanish refugees to Mexico, 
where the Barsky Sanatorium was created in 
1945 (Deery, 2009: 173)9. But by the following 
January, the Committee was forced to appear 
before HUAC, marking the beginning of  a 
costly legal process that would take ten years 
(prompting its own fundraising campaigns) 
and would absorb much of  the surgeon’s 
                                                 
9 In 1944 he wrote a 300-page memoir that still remains unpublished 
prodigious energy. When he was released from 
jail in November 1950 and reunited with his 
wife and two-year-old daughter, he had lost 
more than twenty pounds and suffered from 
ulcers. He withdrew from the direction of  the 
JAFRC in January. In 1955 a series of  
economic and legal setbacks forced the JAFRC 
to dissolve (Deery, 2009: 192). Barsky 
continued to be involved in progressive causes. 
In 1964 he was a founding member of  the 
Medical Committee for Human Rights, which 
gave medical help to activists who dared to join 
in the violent struggles for civil rights for 
African-Americans in the US South. Later, he 
protested the war in Vietnam. He did not live 
to see the end of  the dictatorship in Spain; he 
died nine months before Francisco Franco. 
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